Terrorism, and our response to it, is among the most compelling European security issues. To expand on a point made by Richard English, we face four kinds of terrorist problem. The first is practical and the second analytical, and our difficulties in responding to the practical problem have been significantly exacerbated by our failings with regard to the analytical. The third kind of terrorist problem is informational and the fourth perceptual. For many years, data-driven analysis and information regarding the terrorist risk Europe is facing have failed to reach opinion-makers and mainstream audiences.
Among a wide range of challenges, EU member states have been facing a growing threat from terrorism in the recent years. The primary responsibility for combating terrorism lies with each individual member state, although the threat is becoming increasingly cross-border and diverse. Regardless of whether terrorism poses a real or perceived threat to the states’ and citizens’ security, public opinion is one important force behind the extensive counterterrorism efforts undertaken in Europe. In this article, we explore the influence of public opinion on EU policy within the security domain in the period 2005–19. We investigate the relationship between the number of attacks carried out on EU territory and citizens’ increased concern for terrorist attacks, as well as the attention given to this topic by EU decision-makers. Based on data from Eurobarometer, the Global Terrorism Database, and evidence from official documents, we perform an analysis of the connection between public perception and anti-terrorism policy coordination in the EU. The results of this investigation point to increasing levels of collective securitization and an ever-stronger focus on security and counterterrorism in the European Union. Our findings are related to policy formation in the EU.
Drawing on the developing literature on a ‘European penology’ this article seeks to use counterterrorism as a lens through which to re-examine arguments concerning penal moderation in Europe. Counterterrorism measures adopted in the EU and the USA in the post-9/11 period are therefore scrutinized for the lessons they hold about the role of European values and institutions as a ‘shield’ against punitiveness or indeed their ability to, swordlike, cut deep into citizens’ freedoms. The resulting analysis raises questions about the need for a more refined approach to the question of ‘European’ penal values as well as pointing up the continued existence of a culture of rights in the USA.
The article examines the role of NGOs in the politicisation of EU security. The focus of the empirical analysis lies on the field of EU counter-terrorism. The cases selected are two different types of legal acts, adopted in the aftermath of serious terrorist attacks in EU member states: The EU data retention directive and the EU passenger name record (PNR) directive. These policies present intrusiveness and relevance for Brussels-based and national civil rights NGOs since they both aim to touch upon individual liberties, like privacy rights or the right to protect personal data. The article goes further by opening up the black box of politicisation. It does so by assuming that politicisation is characterised by a certain level of salience, actor range and polarisation. The paper links politicisation literature to research on the influence of interest groups that are discussing, for example, voice, access or litigation as strategies. Therewith, the paper contributes to the scientific debate on politicisation in two ways: First, it sheds light on the so far disregarded role of NGOs in politicisation. Second, it builds a bridge to interest group literature by examining repertoires of NGOs in politicisation.
By taking the European Union as a principal focal point, this chapter will evaluate critically the rule of law challenges arising from the production and operation of counterterrorism norms. The article will focus on four case studies, two involving the rule of law ex ante (at the stage of adoption of EU law) and two involving the rule of law ex post (looking at its impact). In terms of ex ante rule of law challenges, the chapter will analyse the production of binding standards by the global executive and the trickle-down effect of these standards at the regional, EU and national level and the limits of scrutiny and justification of counterterrorism legislation on emergency grounds. In terms of rule of law ex post, the chapter will examine challenges of counterterrorism law to the principle of legality via over-criminalisation and the adoption of vague and broad definitions of terrorism, as well as challenges to the right to a fair trial and principle of effective judicial protection resulting from state arbitrariness in the mechanism of producing terrorist sanctions.
Faced with a persistent international terrorist threat, the European Union is playing an ever more ambitious role in counter-terrorism. Even though primary responsibility for combating crime and ensuring security lies with the Member States, the EU provides cooperation, coordination and (to some extent) harmonisation tools, as well as financial support, to address this borderless phenomenon. Moreover, the assumption that there is a connection between development and stability, as well as between internal and external security, has come to shape EU action beyond its own borders. EU spending in the area of counter-terrorism has increased over the years, to allow for better cooperation between national law enforcement authorities and enhanced support by the EU bodies in charge of security and justice, such as Europol, eu-LISA and Eurojust. The many new rules and instruments that have been adopted in recent years range from harmonising definitions of terrorist offences and sanctions, and sharing information and data, to protecting borders, countering terrorist financing, and regulating firearms. However, implementing and evaluating the various measures is a challenging task.
On 9 December 2020, along with its counter-terrorism agenda, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation to reinforce the mandate of Europol, the EU law enforcement cooperation agency. The proposed regulation principally aims at rendering Europol's cooperation with private parties more effective; at responding to the agency's 'big data challenge', by providing a legal basis for processing large and complex datasets, including personal data of data subjects not related to a crime; and at providing a reinforced role for Europol in relation to research and innovation for law enforcement.
Dissemination of terrorist content is one of the most widespread and most dangerous forms of misuse of online services in the field of internal security. In line with the 2015 European agenda on security, and taking into account the impact of this propaganda on the radicalisation, recruitment and training of terrorists, the European Commission launched a voluntary system for tackling terrorism online, based on guidelines and recommendations. However, given the limitations of self-regulation, in September 2018 the Commission proposed a regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online through the removal of such content within one hour of being posted.
This is the fourth Peace and Security Outlook produced by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). The series is designed to analyse and explain the contribution of the European Union to the promotion of peace and security internationally, through its various external policies. The study provides an overview of the issues and current state of play. It looks first at the concept of peace and the changing nature of the geopolitical environment, in light of global shifts of power and of the impact of the coronavirus crisis. It then follows the logic of the annual series, by focusing on the promotion of peace and security in the EU's external action.
The Normandy Index, now in its third year, aims at measuring the level of threat to peace, security and democracy around the world. It was presented for the first time on the occasion of the Normandy Peace Forum in June 2019, as a result of a partnership between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy. The Index has been designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in conjunction with and on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace. This paper sets out the findings of the 2021 exercise, and explains how the index can be used to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country's performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions.
This report describes the key features, technologies and processes of strategic communications to counter hybrid threats and their components. The theoretical description of hybrid threats is complemented by the analysis of diverse case studies, describing the geopolitical context in which the hybrid threat took place, its main features, the mechanisms related to strategic communications used by the victim to counter the hybrid threat and its impact and consequences. A comprehensive set of policy options aimed at improving the EU response to hybrid threats is also provided.
This paper takes as its starting point recent terror attacks in the European Union and seeks to understand why the EU has suffered such a wave of high-profile, damaging attacks. Specifically, the paper explores counter-terrorism policy at the EU level and investigates why the integration of EU counter-terrorism policy is not higher among individual member states. Following an examination of previous terrorist incidents in the history of the EU and a literature review on EU-level counter-terrorism policy, the paper explores counter-terrorism institutions and mechanisms within the EU. A substantial analysis of the level of integration (or lack thereof) of these institutions and mechanisms is then undertaken, before by a concluding section that offers policy revisions to increase the implementation of policies by member states. The paper ultimately argues that implementation of counter-terrorism policy is lacking because individual member states are reluctant to cede their sovereignty over such an important policy area.